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ABSTRACT. The term “Yellow” is a synonym for strikebreaker in many European societies (gelbe, amarillo, 
giallo, etc.). In pre-1914 Europe, which remained dominated by monarchies, only in republican France this 
term was explicitly used by a nationalist armed group of strikebreakers, namely, the Yellow movement. In 
1899-1901, the French and industrial society experienced an unprecedented wave of massive strikes. His-
torians saw this popular mobilisation as a prefiguration of the “great labour unrest”, which subsequently 
affected the United Kingdom, between 1911 and 1914. The mobilisation of French workers and republican 
citizens in this fin de siècle took place in the industrial stronghold of France, along the German border. As a 
reaction, powerful industrialists created the first “Yellow” organisations. They explicitly conceived them as 
their “social movement”. At the turn of the century, these strikebreakers were officially recognised by oc-
troy. This differentiated the Yellow movement (with a capital “Y”) from the many informal yellow organisa-
tions which emerged concomitantly, with the same antidemocratic purpose. This article provides an origi-
nal analysis of the case of the Yellow movement. It explains how this Paris-based organisation developed 
by practicing political violence through strikebreaking, and why its transnational development was so im-
portant.  
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1. Introduction 
In pre-1914 Europe, only in republican France a nationalist armed group explicitly 
used the term “Yellow” to designate its antidemocratic violence based on strikebreak-
ing. That is why the Yellow movement requires the use of a capital letter, in contrast 
with the other “yellow” organisations which emerged concomitantly, although they 
shared the same antidemocratic aim. The industrialists who secretly funded the Yellow 
movement (or Fédération Nationale des Jaunes de France, that is, National Federation 
of the Yellows from France; FNJF) termed it their “social movement”.1 This concept was 
also used by the private companies of the European monarchies dominating pre-1914 
Europe. They imported the Yellow movement based in Paris as “the most modern so-
cial movement from France” (Bonnet and Caruso 2019).2 By analysing this organisation 
based in Paris, this article provides a cross-disciplinary contribution to the sociology of 
social movements aiming at “bringing capitalism back” (Della Porta 2015). The chrono-
logical focus of my work ranges from 1870 to 1914. This “first globalisation” was char-
acterized by an unparalleled development of the financial flows (Berger 2003). Their 
transnational dimension echoes the scale of the Yellow movement.  
Defining the latter requires to trace its genesis. This movement was created at the 
turn of the century, in the industrial stronghold of the French society, namely, 
Montceau-Creusot (Saône-et-Loire, East of France). The first Yellow organisations were 
conceived there during the unprecedented wave of strikes which marked the turn of 
the century (1899-1901). These strikes especially affected the East of France, that is, 
the most industrialised area of this society, whose long-established unification made it 
the industrial heart of continental Europe (Cameron 1961; Roehl 1976; Cameron and 
Freedman 1983). Historians have compared the big strikes of the East of France at the 
turn of the century to the “great labour unrest” which happened between 1911 and 
1914 in the United Kingdom (Cronin 2018, 71). “The first Yellow organisations were es-
tablished in Le Creusot on 1 November 1899. On 1 December those of Montceau-les-
Mines were created” observed the republican police.3 In 1902, the FNJF was institu-
tionalised and centralised from Paris, to operate in the industrial cities.  
These strikebreakers received a private and yet official unction. On 23 January 1902, 
the President of the Republic, Émile Loubet, invited the principal leaders of the Yellow 
movement to the Élysée Palace. The first leader of the FNJF, Paul Lanoir (the son of a 
 
1 Pierre Biétry, Le socialisme et les jaunes, Paris, Plon, 1906, p. 148. The archival sources and documents 
from the historical libraries are all quoted in footnotes. The author is responsible for all the translations. 
2 “Die Gelbe Bewegung. Ein Mittel zur Zurückdrängung des sozialistischen Einflusses”, Mitteilungen der 
Zeitschrift, Die Arbeit, Vienna, N. 1004, 1908, p. 2. Le Jaune, 21/03/1908, p. 2. 
3 Report of the 21/04/1902, Archives Nationales (AN), F/7/12793. 
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gendarme, who was himself suspected of going undercover among workers) was pre-
sent at the Élysée, accompanied by his secretary, Pierre Biétry (that republican police-
men evoked as “the infiltrated agent of nationalists and clerical reactionaries” during 
the big strikes of the turn of the century).4 There, Lanoir delivered a speech by claiming 
that there were 215 Yellow organisations in the French industrial cities, and by affirm-
ing: “our goal, Monsieur le Président, is to create, anywhere there is a factory (…), a un-
ion of conciliation (…) between employers and employees”. In turn, President Loubet 
repeated the words of Lanoir, stating that “our aim is social peace”, before consecrat-
ing this nationalist organisation: “How cannot we not approve such a beautiful action? 
(…) the struggle of classes? What a utopia!”.5 This official denial of the complex reality 
of classes was celebrated by the Yellow strikebreakers as “the triumph of the Reason in 
Paris”.6 
Lanoir was soon expelled by Biétry, whose financial interests informed all his posi-
tions. Undercover policemen observed that the more stable aim of this Yellow leader 
was “to make money on the back of workers”.7 In 1903, Biétry founded the Parti Social-
iste National (PSN; National Socialist Party). This nationalist, corporatist and vertical or-
ganisation was secretly bankrolled by the antirepublican hierarchs of religious congre-
gations.8 The PSN was centralised in Paris too, as “a particularly aggressive phalanx” 
whose activists were recruited “for policing purposes” in the “industrial cities”, where 
these antidemocratic activists targeted the “internationalists”.9 This anti-
internationalist and antirepublican strikebreaking conferred to Biétry the control of the 
FNJF (created in 1902), and of its newspaper, Le Jaune (The Yellow, created in 1904). Its 
nationalist propaganda preached hatred of “State socialism”.10 It also addressed to 
“the enemies of Revolution” that these antirepublican strikebreakers termed “inde-
pendent workers”, since they renounced to practice any democratic citizenship by fol-
 
4 La lutte sociale de Seine et Oise, 22/02/1902, p. 1. Commissaire spécial de Montbéliard to the Minister of 
the Interior, 05/01/1900, AN, F/7/15931/2. L’Humanité, 24/12/1908, p. 1. 
5 The FNJF at the Élysée in the first Yellow organ L’Union Ouvrière, 01/01/1902, p. 1, conserved in AN, 
F/7/12793. See also Report of Louis, “M. Loubet et les Jaunes”, AN, F/7/12793. 
6 L’Union Ouvrière, 01/01/1902, p. 1, AN, F/7/12793. The counterrevolutionary “organisations of corpora-
tion” recalling the feudal times attracted the promotors of the Yellow movement, whatever their official 
political label. See Jules Méline in La République Française, 11/03/1906, conserved in AN, F/7/12793. 
7  “Metz”, 11/10/1904, AN, F/7/15931/2. 
8 Report of “Naples”, 20/07/1903, AN, F/7/15931/2. 
9 Manifesto of the PSN in La Croix, 09/01/1903, p. 3, Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, 
05/01/1903, p. 3. 
10 Le Jaune, 13/02/1904, p. 1 
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lowing the antirepublican precept: “take care yourself of yourself alone and not of the 
others”.11  
Monarchists and “big industrialists” provided conspicuous funding to the Yellow 
movement, and to its nationalist ideology.12 In late 1909, Le Jaune was transformed in-
to La Voix Française (The French Voice). “Against the monopolies of the State” was its 
very subtitle. In contrast, these nationalist and counterrevolutionary activists praised 
the feudal times and the corporations.13 These pre-modern associative forms and their 
corresponding affiliations were “previous to the Revolution of 1789” having imposed 
the principle of popular sovereignty, and these antirepublican strikebreakers lauded 
corporatism because it “escaped the control of any public power”, by mechanically re-
producing the antidemocratic “hierarchy of classes”.14 The Yellow movement worked 
for this established order and its nationalist activists were literally counterrevolutionar-
ies, that is, diametrically opposed to the democratic and popular conquests of the Rev-
olution of 1789, realised through popular mobilisations without precedents in the in-
dustrial heart of Europe. Its democratic effects durably radiated throughout the “long 
nineteenth century” ranging from 1789 to 1914 (Hobsbawm 1989, 1996, 2010).  
The Yellow movement was created in fin de siècle Paris. The broad scale of action of 
these antirepublican strikebreakers marked their originality. Indeed, the Yellow mem-
bership among the French workers and republican citizens in pre-1914 France was in-
significant. At that time, however, the academics (such as Paul Leroy-Beaulieu) linked 
to the Yellow movement claimed (without sources) that the Yellow movement repre-
sented “the Law” and “the number”.15 The ungrounded claims of this nationalist prop-
aganda have largely been taken for granted by “classical” historiography, especially 
during the Cold War period. Its geopolitical power relations necessarily weakened the 
comparative history of European societies, which are so different, as evidenced by the 
republican singularity in pre-1914 Europe which remained dominated by monarchies 
(Audoin-Rouzeau 2001, 185).  
Scholars have often postulated a link between the FNJF and the “working class”, 
without being able to prove it. None sources, for example, support the allegation that 
“no doubt many were drawn into Les Jaunes” (Mosse 1972, 200), what logically raises 
scientific doubts. This never-demonstrated position presuming that the FNJF embodied 
a “true proletarian dimension” has been repeated and reinforced (Sternhell 1997, 319). 
 
11 Le Jaune, 30/04/1904, p. 1 
12 Report of “Metz”, 11/10/1904, AN, F/7/12793 
13 Le Jaune, 01/06/1907, p. 1. 
14 Pierre Biétry, Les Jaunes de France et la question ouvrière, Paris, Paclot, 1906, p. 10, 15. 
15 Le Jaune, 31/03/1906, p. 2.  
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When supposing the round number of 100,000 Yellow members, however, these same 
authors acknowledge an “artifice of quantification”, that is hardly justified as being 
“not completely imaginary” (1997, 319 and 326). The reality is that only 30 delegates 
representing 50 Yellow organisations took part in the national congress of the FNJF in 
1904 (Sternhell 1997, 398). Contrary to the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), 
whose democratic institution was created by French workers and republican citizens, 
and whose federalist organisation created in 1895 had 1791 unions and 600,000 mem-
bers in 1904, the nationalist groupuscules of the FNJF were organised vertically, from 
the top of the social ladder.16 For example, Deguesselle, a foreman in the Tourcoing 
spinning industry, represented no less than 106 Yellow organisations.17  
Recently, historians have observed that “what characterised the Jaunes was clearly 
(…) the purpose of preventing and obstructing strikes” (Meriggi 2014, 138). Yet, the 
violent forms of this Yellow strikebreaking have gone unobserved until now. “The right 
to strike is not tolerable” confessed the Yellow leader, through a nationalist denial of 
the national and republican legality.18 Which were the characteristics of Yellow strike-
breaking, and to what extent was this social movement peculiar in pre-1914 Europe? 
To answer this comparative-as-transnational problématique, this case-study-based ar-
ticle focus on Yellow strikebreaking in the French society, by articulating the different 
scales from the local to the global dimension (Passeron and Revel, 2005). The demon-
stration, which mobilises a large array of original sources, is divided to three parts. The 
context of emergence of the Yellow movement is analysed since the counterrevolu-
tionary aftermath of the Commune, before moving on to examine the violent practices 
of antirepublican strikebreaking deployed in the economic and political fields. 
 
 
2. Political Violence, Strikes and the Genesis of the Yellow Movement (1870-
1914) 
 
The Yellow movement of antirepublican strikebreakers is inseparable from the peri-
od stretching from the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) to the First World War (1914-
1918), as well as from the category of the “monopoly of legitimate physical violence 
within a particular territory”, through which Max Weber (2004, 33) famously defined 
the “modern State”. He did so during the context of the first post-World War, which 
 
16 Official statistics quoted in Maxime Leroy, La coutume ouvrière. Syndicats, Bourses du travail, Fédéra-
tions Professionnelles, Coopératives, Paris, Girard, 1913, p. 32, 476. 
17 André Marsaudon, Les syndicats jaunes, Rouen, Guérin, 1912, p. 49. 
18 Pierre Biétry, Le Trépied, Paris, Société Française d’Imprimerie et de Librairie, 1911, p. 93. 
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was characterised by the violent collapse of the monarchies, by reusing a concept 
which at least dated back from the creation of the German Empire (or Kaiserreich) in 
1871 in Paris (Anter 2014, 29).19  
During this period linking the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (1870-1914), how-
ever, industrialisation increased exponentially, as did imperialism, which prompts us to 
reconsider the concept of the monopoly. The elites dominating the new German Em-
pire were inseparable from the ones which dominated the French society, and their 
transnational relations pre-existed. They agreed to merchandise the industrial East of 
the national territory, shortly before the brutal repression of the popular insurrection 
of the Commune. The bloody week (21 to 28 May 1871) made thousands and thou-
sands of casualties among the French workers and republican citizens targeted as in-
ternal enemies. It constitutes an event of political violence “without parallel in nine-
teenth century in Europe” (Tombs 1994, 87; Tombs 2012, 682, 699). Indeed, its organ-
ised level of lethality directly connects to the twentieth century and this violent reac-
tion was inseparable from internationalism, which was explicitly targeted by this bru-
tality which was reshaping the said monopoly. 
 On 21 August 1871, the head of the Executive Power of the French Republic, Adol-
phe Thiers, who commanded the repression, addressed the Parliamentary Commission 
(then directed by an ex-Foreign Minister of the Second Empire). For the said elites, who 
protected their interests, anti-internationalism legitimated this organised massacre. 
Thiers claimed that the International Workingmen’s Association “radiates all over Eu-
rope” and “scares the entire Europe”. He predicted that, for “all the friends of social 
order in Europe”, the “struggle against the International will be long, difficult”. The 
Commission was hatefully afraid of the between 200,000 and 800,000 estimated inter-
nationalists among the French workers and republican citizens, whose solidarity in-
creased “the normal price of manpower”. Thiers targeted one particular répertoire: 
“strike”. Besides, he observed that “never any other insurrection in the world had dis-
posed of equivalent means: 400,000 rifles, 3,000 canons”. Thus, he encouraged “con-
stant surveillance”, through the “haute police” (a French term translatable as the gov-
ernmental police enforcing covertly the raison d’État). To legitimate this official and yet 
obscurantist practice, he turned the social facts upside down, by affirming that interna-
tionalism was “very occult”.20  
The anti-internationalist and counterrevolutionary dimension of the major event of 
political violence of the Commune modified the said monopoly (Deluermoz 2012, 360). 
 
19 Rudolph Sohm, Die Fränkische Reichs- und Gerichtsverfassung, Weimar, Hermann Böhlau, 1871, p. X-XIV. 
20 All the quotations of Thiers are from Enquête Parlementaire sur l’insurrection du 18 mars Tome II, Ver-
sailles, Cerf, 1872, 1-21. 
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The metamorphoses of the control of violence involving with the most emblematic of 
the armed groups: the Garde Nationale, which was inherited from the Revolution of 
1789, as well as the public control on arms (Gainot 2015). In 1871, the Garde Natio-
nale, whose non-revolutionary attempt of late imitation in monarchies proved to be a 
complete failure (Francia 1999), was prohibited because it had supported the popular 
insurrection of the Commune.21 Recently, comparative historians observing the French 
society have evoked a “de facto monopoly” (Charles 2001, 256). The latter echoes the 
concept used by Max Weber to designate the institutionalised effectiveness of the pub-
lic control of violence, which involves arms, armed practices and armed groups. A 
broad historiographical consensus exists around the reality of the “de facto monopoly”, 
which is linked to the durable republican singularity (Johansen 2005; Houte 2010; Del-
uermoz 2012; Berlière and Lévy 2013; Warfman and Ocqueteau 2011), in contrast with 
the monarchies which dominated pre-1914 Europe. Between 1789 and 1914, for ex-
ample, “police” necessarily meant “public”, what stresses the socio-legal existence of 
the “de facto monopoly” in the industrial heart of Europe.22  
The institutional legitimacy of this public control of violence was shaped by this in-
dustrial dimension, whose hyper centralisation had been reinforced by the Jacobins. In 
agreement with the French and republican citizenship, strikes in the cities of this indus-
trial society happened without violence in two thirds of cases between 1870 and 1890 
(Perrot 1975, 568), and in more than 98 percent of cases between 1890 and 1914 (Tilly 
and Shorter 1975, 103). This sociological regularity, which evidenced the republican 
and durable control of violence, is all the more noticeable since strikes increased by 
1,667 percent between 1866 and 1911 (Perrot 1975, 49). Therefore, the Yellow strike-
breakers tried to turn these social facts upside down, by claiming that “French workers 
are violent”.23 
In so doing, their nationalist propaganda tried to legitimize the illegality of their own 
violent practices, that they deployed beyond the republican reality of the “de facto 
monopoly”. Moreover, it is no accident that the leader of the Yellow movement, when 
this nationalist activist infiltrated the big strikes of the turn of the century, encouraged 
“to arm the strikers with rifles”, what legitimized their repression.24 Interestingly 
 
21 Bulletin des lois de la République française, Douzième série, Deuxième semestre de 1871, p. 90, 91. In 
contrast with industrial France, the Atlantic societies remained deprived of any centralised institution of 
police, until 1878 for the United Kingdom, and until 1908 for the United States. 
22 Albert Strauss, Des autorités investies d’attribution de police, Paris, Jouve, 1898, p. 16.  
23 Biétry, Le socialisme, 304. 
24 La lutte sociale de Seine et Oise, 22/02/1902, p. 1. Commissaire spécial de Montbéliard to the Minister 
of the Interior, 05/01/1900, AN, F/7/15931/2. L’Humanité, 24/12/1908, p. 1. 
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enough, armed practices contrasted with the use of the republican citizenship. The lat-
ter was based on the pioneering use of the universal suffrage, by freely deliberating 
workers accustomed to the contradictory dialogue, which was linked to the democratic 
enforcement of their peaceful claims. In contrast with this republican legality, jurists 
praised the monarchies which dominated pre-1914 Europe because they made the vio-
lent use of arms juridically more possible.25 
In addition, the nationalist activists of the Yellow movement denied the national and 
republican reality, by praising “the True Foreign organisations” of the most industrial of 
the monarchies, because “in Germany, in England (…) unions capitalised”.26 In contrast 
with the democratic character inherent to the republican citizenship, the Yellow 
movement stated that “the goal of all human practices is to accumulate capital”.27 
Their practices were structurally conditioned by this dogmatic belief in an economic 
determinism, which denied any freedom to the agencies. Antirepublican strikebreaking 
reproduced and reinforced the nationalist character of this belief, by denying the re-
publican legality. That is why these counterrevolutionary activists pretended to “abol-
ish the so-called workers’ legislation”, and especially “the illegitimate Law of 1884” 
which legalised the unions of the French workers and republican citizens, that they la-
belled “stupid”, because their strikes were opposed to “the motor of social inequali-
ties”.28 Indeed, the Yellow movement and its violence aimed at reproducing the anti-
democratic “hierarchy of classes”.29 To deny structurally any freedom to the agencies, 
their nationalism operated violently and beyond the republican reality of the “de facto 
monopoly”, through a fanaticism anticipating Fascism. 
In contrast with this capitalist, individualist and violent dogma, French unionism was 
based on individual volunteerism, which was diametrically opposed to private and im-
mediate benefits. Indeed, the legal struggles conducted by the French workers and re-
publican citizens for better working conditions were potentially applied to all republi-
can citizens, and not only to the members of the unions, in contrast with other associa-
tive forms. These immediate objectives were revolutionarily shaping the republican re-
ality, through the main goal of the French workers and republican citizens, that is, to 
abolish the global domination of the “capitalist class” (Charter of Amiens, 1906). This 
reality peacefully enforced through strikes was inseparable from an absolute singulari-
 
25 Cour d’appel de Paris on 22/06/1886, Répertoire général alphabétique du droit français, Tome V, Paris, 
Larose Forcel, 1889, p. 175. Joseph Toinet, La légitime défense du droit de propriété, Paris, Bonvalot-Jouve, 
1908, p. 5, 6.  
26 Biétry, Les Jaunes, 34, 55, 57. 
27 Biétry, Le socialisme, 15. 
28 Biétry, Le Trépied, 79, 57, 109. 
29 Pierre Biétry, Les Jaunes de France et la question ouvrière, Paris, Paclot, 1906, p. 10, 15. 
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ty of French unionism in pre-1914 Europe, namely, the revolutionary independence of 
the CGT from any political party (Febvre 2012).30 Thus, the democratic and peaceful 
spirit of French unionism was condemned by the nationalists of the Yellow movement 
as deriving from “their great ancestors the Jacobins”.31 “Public pensions mean trickery” 
stated the antirepublican strikebreakers about the popular conquests.32 
In contrast with the republican reality, the Yellow propaganda presented the nation-
alist and counterrevolutionary movement as an “anti-State”, by asking more and more 
openly for “the death of the Republic”.33 To reinforce the antidemocratic aspect of the 
State, and to protect the interests of the industrialists, they affirmed that “the respect 
of the State develops the race of sub-humans”.34 This corresponded perfectly to their 
dogma of economic liberalism (laisser faire laisser passer), which increasingly contra-
dicted the democratic principles inherent to political liberalism (freedom of opinion, of 
expression, etc.). The latter was inseparable from the republican citizenship practiced 
by the French workers through their unions. In contrast with this democratic reality, 
during the big strikes of the turn of the century, the mentor and sponsor of Biétry in 
the industrial East of France, the industrialist Gaston Japy (nicknamed “Whip the First” 
and “the Yellow industrialist”, because of his violent absolutism) used a whip to badly 
beat his own cousin during a board of directors, because the latter recognised “unam-
biguously the Law of 1884 legalising unions”.35 
These antirepublican strikebreakers were part of a broad antidemocratic reaction 
which involved the centralisation of the bosses (the term “patron” is hard to render in 
English, which has also imported the concept of “bourgeoisie”; Fraboulet 2007). Inter-
estingly enough, this centralisation proceeded from the industrial centre of Le Creusot, 
which was dominated by the international arms merchant Schneider, who also created 
the Yellow movement. To create the Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières 
(UIMM; Union for the Metallurgical and Mining Industries), Eugène II Schneider urged 
bosses to “unify in committees” for the “defence of our interests”, and he referred to 
the big strikes of the turn of century by affirming that “by defending the factories of Le 
Creusot, I was defending the French industry” (Parize 2009, 197). Parallelly, Schneider-
 
30 “Socialism imbricated to unionism just means profit” commented witnesses on this pre-1914 reformism, 
whose falsely subversive rhetoric durably served the counterrevolutionary and nationalist positions, Luigi 
Fabbri, La Contro-Rivoluzione Preventiva, Bologna, Cappelli, 1922, p. 45. 
31 Biétry, Les jaunes, 80. 
32 La Voix Française, 09/04/1910, p. 1. 
33 Le Jaune, 04/12/1909, p. 1. La Voix Française 23/04/1910, p. 1. 
34 Le Jaune, 13/09/1906, p. 1. 
35 Le Petit Comtois, 23/10/1899, p. 3. Conseil de Gérance Japy, 21/11/1899, Archives du Musée Japy de 
Beaucourt. Archives Départementales du Doubs, U5089. AN, F/7/12793, Report of “Lazare”, 15/12/1905. 
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Creusot created the first Yellow organisation of the Nouveau Syndicat des Corporations 
Ouvrières (NUWC; New Union of Working Corporations). On 15 December 1899, the 
prefect observed that its few followers were “obeying the boss”, whose antidemocratic 
and antirepublican end was “to perturb the action of the union” (Parize 1970, 171). 
That is why the Yellow movement was immediately identified as a “counter union” 
by the republican forces of police of Le Creusot, as well as by those of the neighbouring 
Montceau where this antidemocratic organisation instantly expanded.36 The term 
“counter union” had been forged by the Schneider company itself, when its hierarchs 
secretly created this Yellow movement of antirepublican strikebreakers.37 Yet, this um-
bilical link relating them to the very top of the social ladder was carefully and durably 
concealed by the nationalist propaganda of the Yellow movement, although witnesses 
observed that it was “obviously created by the bosses”.38 This is exactly why the ideol-
ogy of these counterrevolutionary and antirepublican strikebreakers tried to turn the 
social facts upside down. They invoked a popular legitimacy which, in fact, did not ex-
ist, in order to assault the French workers and republican citizens, by covertly using 
small forms of violence beyond the socio-legal reality of the “de facto monopoly”. 
As well as the industrialists, who were behind their secret creation and who funded 
them, these Yellow strikebreakers claimed that they acted for the “French industry”.39 
Indeed, their antidemocratic purpose of illegal and yet unpunished violence required 
the rhetorical usurpation of this national dimension, in order to deny its republican le-
gality and in agreement with the Yellow dogmatic belief: “the goal of all human prac-
tices is to accumulate capital”.40 This nationalist dogma was inseparable from the coun-
terrevolutionary creation of these antirepublican strikebreakers in the industrial center 
of Le Creusot dominated by an international arms merchant. In 1898, the personal 
wealth of Henri Schneider reached the sum of 110,000,000 Gold Francs (De Brissac 
2007, 78), especially thanks to the Law of 1885. The latter created a turning point in 
pre-1914 Europe. For the very first time, it liberalised the industrial production of the 
arms in France, as well as their international trade.41 As early as in 1890, Schneider-
Creusot equipped the armies of 22 States (Beaucarnot 1986, 190), it exported 90,000 
 
36 Commissioner of Montceau, 28/04/1900, Archives Départementales de Saône-et-Loire (ADSL), M 3296. 
Gendarmerie Nationale Section of Le Creusot to Préfet, 13/01/1900, ADSL, M 3288. 
37 Note de Saint Girons à Schneider, 19/10/1899, Académie François Bourdon (AFB), SS0199. 
38 Félicien Challaye, “Le syndicalisme jaune”, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, t. 20, n. 2, 1912, pp. 
256-263, p. 256. 
39 Biétry, Les Jaunes, 102.  
40 Biétry, Le socialisme, 15. 
41 Proposition de loi sur la libre fabrication des armes et le commerce des armes et munitions de tir, Paris, 
Quantin, 03/07/1884. Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de l’Intérieur, n. 11, 1885, pp. 281-284. 
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canons between 1885 and 1914 and, in 1898, 80 percent of its arms production (De 
Brissac 2007, 113 and 149). “This always works, this is boundless this thing!”, com-
mented the industrialist on this private accumulation inseparable from violence.42  
This international development of capitalism resisted any public control of the dem-
ocratic and republican legality. “I don’t admit any intervention of a Prefect in the 
strikes”, declared Henri Schneider in the 1890s.43 “It is full of spies here” proudly testi-
fied one of his foremen about this illegal and concealed surveillance, shortly before the 
big strikes of the turn of the century.44 He acknowledged this antidemocratic violence 
linked to blackmail employment. It was constantly and covertly practiced against the 
French workers and republican citizens of the industrial centre. There, their private life 
was denied, as well as the republican reality of “de facto monopoly”. “Those who tried” 
to applicate their democratic rights were subjected to illegal persecutions, he testi-
fied.45 At the turn of the century, the French workers and republican citizens massively 
mobilised against this omnipresent and yet concealed violence based on illegal surveil-
lance. 
 “We don’t care about the guards!” and “we will have a union” screamed the citizens 
who massively mobilised in the industrial stronghold of Le Creusot during the big 
strikes of the turn of the century.46 In 1899, the workers of Le Creusot mobilised with 
the explicit demand of the “recognition of the union” and of “the suppression of occult 
police”, exactly like those from the neighbouring Montceau, who denounced the “oc-
cult police charged by the Company to exert surveillance on workers in all the acts of 
their private life” (Tartakowski 2016).47 This is confirmed by the sub-prefect of Chalon-
sur-Saône who, writing about Montceau on 14 August 1900, explicitly referred to “the 
occult police of the Company”.48 This obscurantism is confirmed by the fact that, since 
the aftermath of the Commune, this private company used secretly and illegally organ-
ised crime as its “private police” (Marchandeau 1981). Interestingly enough, this anti-
republican practice of illegal surveillance and blackmail employment in the economic 
field involved a “reactionary committee” in the political one.49 At the turn of the centu-
 
42 Jules Huret, Enquête sur la question sociale en Europe, Paris, Perrin, 1897, 32. 
43 Ibid., 34. 
44 Ibid.,11 and following. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Report of the Chief of the Guards, 16-29 Mai 1899, AFB, 01L0075-02. 
47 Documents officiels sur la grève du Creusot du 20 au 28 Septembre 1899, p. 3, FFB, SSa207, Statistiques 
des grèves et recours à la conciliation et à l’arbitrage survenus pendant l’année 1901, Paris, Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1902, p. 235. 
48 ADSL, M 3296. 
49 Rapports du Commissaire Spécial de Montceau-les-Mines, 25/06/1890, 08/08/1895, ADSL, M 147. 
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ry, besides, the counterrevolutionary and antirepublican dimension of this secret asso-
ciative form centralised their counterrevolutionary nationalism in Paris.50 
On 22 April 1901, an engineer of the mining company of Montceau, Jacques Gautier 
de Bellefond, was invited to speak at the Société d’Économie Sociale (SES). This Paris-
based international organisation had been created in 1856 by Frédéric Le Play. Histori-
ans have insisted on the central role of this other industrial engineer, to understand 
the durable counterrevolutionary dimension inseparable from the social and political 
control characterising the antirepublican elites (Duroselle 1951, 672). They protected 
their private interests behind a halo of institutionalised sacredness, whose symbolic 
brutality was politically oriented in this antidemocratic and counterrevolutionary way. 
“Social Peace” was therefore the leitmotiv of Le Play.51 De Bellefond was the repre-
sentative in Montceau for the Union pour la Paix Sociale (UPS; Union for Social Peace), 
a counterrevolutionary organisation created by Le Play in 1872. 
Like the Yellow movement, to which it was linked since its genesis at the turn of the 
century, the Paris-based UPS was transnational. In the aftermath of the Commune, be-
sides, the right-hand man of Le Play, Émile Cheysson, another industrial engineer, had 
been the director of the Schneider-Creusot factories.52 While the industrial stronghold 
of Montceau-Creusot became the birthplace of the Yellow movement at the turn of the 
century, De Bellefond avowed at the SES that the industrialists systematically used of 
“private policing” and illegal surveillance, “almost everywhere although we don’t al-
ways have the courage to confess it”.53 Indeed, the antidemocratic concealment of this 
non-lethal, and yet omnipresent form of violence which assaulted the private life of the 
French workers, was imposed to these dominant and industrial elites by the republican 
reality of the “de facto monopoly”. 
One week after De Bellefond, the SES welcomed Monsieur Chambodu, who was in-
troduced by Count Albert de Mun as the representative for the first Yellow organisa-
tions of Montceau-les-Mines. Chambodu defined its strikebreakers “a group of van-
guard” comprised of “soldiers of the army of Social Peace”, by condemning “strike, 
revolution, internationalism” as a whole.54 During the antidemocratic reaction against 
the popular insurrection of the Commune, Count Albert de Mun addressed the Oeuvre 
des Cercles Catholiques d’Ouvriers (Charity of the Catholic Circles of Workers, created 
 
50 Report 04/03/1905, AN, F/7/12793. 
51 Frédéric Le Play, L’école de la paix sociale, Paris, Larcher, 1881. L’Union Ouvrière, 01/01/1902, p. 1, con-
served in AN, F/7/12793. 
52 SSa207, AFB. 
53 La Réforme Sociale, 16/05/1901, p. 793.  
54 All the quotations are from Chambodu in Ibid. p. 777, 776, 778.  
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in 1871) as “the first volunteers (…) for the defence of social order” and as “the van-
guard of counterrevolution”.55 In his talk condemning strikes, this aristocrat introduced 
Chambodu at the SES (created by Le Play) by complaining that the unions of French 
workers and republican citizens were an effective “tool of resistance against the capi-
tal”.56 The genesis of the Yellow movement, which is inseparable from the latter, sig-
nals that the industrial (Le Play) and the spiritual (De Mun) tendencies of social Catholi-
cism were integrated at the turn of the century. This enriches our knowledge of the po-
litical and counterrevolutionary commitment involving institutionalised sacredness 
(Levillain 1983). 
Interestingly enough, Count de Mun had a private correspondence with the industri-
alist Schneider, who created the Yellow movement. After the Encyclical Rerum Novar-
um (1891), which preceded the political recognition of the French Republican State by 
the hierarchs of the age-old Rome-based institution of the Catholic, Apostolic and Ro-
man Church (1892), the industrialist wrote to the aristocrat: “there is no longer any dif-
ference between us”, and proclaimed: “the Encyclical! Read the Encyclical! All is 
there”.57 Parallelly, the industrialist affirmed as an antirepublican dogma his “absolute 
right” based on the fact that “the Law does not constrain me to recognise the union”.58 
And indeed, the industrial centre was a space of exception avoiding the democratic 
practice of the republican citizenship. This denial of justice through juridicism tended 
to paralyse the socio-legal reality of the “de facto monopoly”. The democratic control 
of violence ceased in the industrial centre as if there was an imperceptible barrier.  
From that point of view, this republican situation was not so different from the 
monarchies which dominated pre-1914 Europe. Interestingly enough, Schneider noise-
lessly blackmailed the official recognition of these Yellow strikebreakers to Pierre Wal-
deck-Rousseau, who headed the government of “republican defence”, thus increasing-
ly voided of social content.59 Subsequently, the industrialist canonised the politician as 
“that great jurist”, since he ratified “the method conceived by us”, by imposing “direct 
relationships between bosses and workers”, instead of “asking from the Laws more 
than they can give”.60 Meanwhile, the Yellow movement made its counterrevolutionary 
way by practicing antirepublican strikebreaking in the industrial centres. 
 
55 Albert De Mun, La question sociale, Paris, Œuvre des Cercles Catholiques d’Ouvriers, 1877, 11, 28. 
56 La Réforme Sociale, 16/05/1901, p. 754, 759, 753.  
57 Huret, Enquête, 25, 35. Annales Catholiques: revue religieuse de la France et de l’Église, 27/08/1892, pp. 
471-474. 
58 Letter of Eugène II Schneider to Waldeck-Rousseau, 08/10/1899, AFB, SS0199. Note on the visit of 
Schneider to the President of the Council Waldeck-Rousseau, 06/10/1899, FFB, SS0199. 
59 Meeting between Monsieur Lichtenberger and Monsieur Waldeck-Rousseau, 11/10/1899, AFB, SS0199. 
60 Revue des deux mondes, 14/11/1930, p. 374, 387.  
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3. Yellow Violence in the Economic Field: Strikebreaking 
 
Paris was the capital of the Yellow movement, whose antirepublican strikebreakers 
aimed at accumulating capital, in agreement with their nationalist and counterrevolu-
tionary dogma.61 The French capital, which only three decades earlier had seen the 
popular and internationalist insurrection of the Commune, had meanwhile become the 
stronghold of antirepublican nationalism in pre-1914 Europe, which remained domi-
nated by monarchies. In 1899, the violent groupuscules linked to the Paris-based Ligue 
des Patriotes (LP; League of Patriots) attempted an antirepublican coup d’État.62 In 
1900, the Municipal Council of Paris became an institutional stronghold for these na-
tionalist, antirepublican and counterrevolutionary fanatics. In 1902, this capital institu-
tion granted 38,500 Francs to the emerging FNJF.63 Concomitantly, the Yellow com-
mand post in Paris received “conspicuous funding allowed by the industrialists”, among 
whom Gaston Japy, who provided 500,000 Francs to the Paris-based centre of the Yel-
low movement (Sternhell 1997, 337).64 Its first leader and ex-member of the Boulangist 
movement (which attempted an antidemocratic coup d’État in 1889 with the national-
ist support of the LP), Paul Lanoir, received 200,000 Francs from the Duchess of Uzès 
(who was the main supporter of the failed coup of 1889, Sternhell 1997, 337). Lanoir 
acknowledged this financial support “of the most intelligent and cleaver industrialists”, 
by affirming “needless to tell their name”, on behalf of his interpretation of “inde-
pendence” (Sternhell 1997, 324).65 This meant concealed dependence on capital.  
From its Parisian stronghold, the Yellow movement infiltrated the “industrial cities” 
throughout the national territory.66 The FNJF aimed to spread “anywhere there is a fac-
tory”, in agreement with the nationalist strategy elaborated in its Parisian command 
post.67 In 1902, the antirepublican strikebreakers claimed to have 215 groups spread 
throughout the cities of the national territory.68 This broad scale of action determined 
the importance of the Yellow movement, in spite of its tiny membership. The sources 
remark that “the number of adherents does not matter”, whereas the territorial scale 
did, through the “industrial cities” infiltrated by the nationalist cells of Yellow strike-
 
61 Biétry, Le socialisme, 15. 
62 Affaire de la place de la Nation, Procès Déroulède, Paris, Drapeau, 1899. 
63 Biétry, Le socialisme, 74. 
64 Louis Le Theuff, Histoire de la bourse du travail de Paris, Paris, Rousseau, 1902, p. 90. 
65 Biétry, Le socialisme, 74, 75. 
66 Le Ralliement, 01/01/1902, p. 1.  
67 L’Union Ouvrière, 01/01/1902, p. 1. 
68 Ibid. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 13(1) 2020: 740-771, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i1p740 
  
754 
 
breakers.69 This territorial and quantitative dimension was secretly indicated by the 
Yellow command post to the antirepublican industrialists, and to the monarchists of 
the “political bureau of the Duc d’Orléans” which was based in Paris too.70 The Yellow 
movement was systematically inseparable from the very top of the social ladder, which 
agglomerated several factions of counterrevolutionary, antirepublican and nationalist 
activists. 
In 1904, the Yellow organisation could only count on 35,000 nationalist fanatics, who 
were distributed “all around the industrial centres”.71 In these industrial cities, the Yel-
low cells were nothing less but nationalist groupuscules, whose insignificant member-
ship was systematically below a dozen of members.72 “We say clearly that Yellow or-
ganisations are ghost entities” confessed their own activists.73 “Yellow organisations, in 
fact, are non-existent” avowed these strikebreakers.74 That is precisely why the nation-
alist activists of the Yellow movement were so obsessed by the numerical dimension, 
that they systematically inflated, in agreement with their antidemocratic aim, that is, to 
practice brutality beyond the republican control of violence.75 The Yellow strikebreak-
ers confessed that “to provide employment, industrialists oblige workers to sign a card 
pledging adherence to the Yellow organisation”, thus revealing the illegal practice of 
blackmail employment.76 This omnipresent and yet concealed violence linked to sur-
veillance was inseparable from the Yellow movement, whose centralised strategy of 
concealment through the numerical propaganda was systematically used.  
These antirepublican strikebreakers sought to act covertly, that is, beyond the effec-
tive control of violence linked to the republican reality of the “de facto monopoly”. In 
1904, the Yellow Parisian headquarter claimed to have intervened against the masses 
 
69 11/10/1904, AN, F/7/15931/2.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Report of the 22/11/1904, AN, F/7/15931/2.  
72 Report of the 21/01/1908, AN, F/7/12793. 
73 Jean Gauthier, Le clergé, les royalistes et les jaunes, Paris, Imprimerie spéciale d’édition, 1907, 51. 
74 Ibid.  
75 The inflated numbers produced by the Yellow propaganda were systematically linked to the journalistic 
and to the academic field fields: Auguste Pawlowski, Les syndicats jaunes, Paris, Alcan, 1911, p. 42, 46, 49. 
Marsaudon, Les syndicats, 45, 49, 51. Maurice Gros, Étude du mouvement syndical ouvrier en France: syn-
dicats “jaunes ou indépendants”, Paris, Jouve, 1905, p. 309, 293. Robert Warin, Les syndicats jaunes. Leur 
histoire. Leurs doctrines. 1899-1908, Paris, Jouve, 1908, p. 296. They would require at least one another 
article. The point of this demonstration is not to present the few adherents of the Yellow movement as 
tools of the counterrevolutionary, nationalist and privileged activists, although they are omnipresent in the 
large array of original sources mobilised here. The point of this article is to analyse the practices of antire-
publican strikebreaking, since this violence signals the Yellow ideology in action through time and space.  
76 Gauthier, Le clergé, 52. Chambre des députés, 03/11/1905, p. 3021. 
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of French workers and republican citizens in 800 industrial cities in France. “We are 
armed (…) and we will fire on our aggressors in self-defence”, they said.77 To be able to 
attack more violently those who legally practiced their republican citizenship, these na-
tionalists tried to turn the social facts upside down, by claiming that they were acting in 
defence. From the industrial harbour of Marseille, the leader of the Yellow movement 
himself defined his troops as “rude boys” and “volunteers to attack (...) with the stick in 
hand”.78 Yet, as time passed, the Yellow strikebreakers became prisoners of their own 
ideological contradictions, that is, the absence of any popular support behind them. 
Shortly before 1914, their calls to take up firearms more and more openly replaced 
calls to wield sticks. In 1911, Biétry encouraged his nationalist groupuscules to “make 
people respect, with the revolver in hand”, what he called “the Freedom of Work”.79 In 
agreement with his counterrevolutionary dogma, this meant to illegally accumulate 
capital beyond the republican reality of the “de facto monopoly. 
During the summer of 1905, Biétry took the train from Paris to Longwy (Meurthe-et-
Moselle, on the Franco-German border, in the industrial East). He was accompanied by 
rude fellows. A meeting was organised in a factory of Longwy, whose director had 
called on and paid the Paris-based strikebreakers (Gordon 1996a, 96; Bonnet 1981, 
139).80 In the industrial centre of Longwy, the nationalist leader of the Yellow move-
ment introduced a certain Monsieur Mangematin, as a memorial symbol. Mangematin, 
according to Biétry, was the historical founder of the first Yellow organisation created 
in 1899 in Le Creusot.81 In fact, Mangematin worked at that time as a private guard for 
the industrialist Schneider, when this worldwide arms merchant created the Yellow 
movement, to void the democratic dialogue with the French workers and republican 
citizens.82 Interestingly enough, the blackmail-employment-style system of surveil-
lance, whose omnipresent form of antidemocratic violence was developed by Schnei-
der-Creusot in the counterrevolutionary aftermath of the Commune, received a public 
unction of institutionalised sacredness to which contributed the neighbouring abbot of 
Autun, Jean-Alphonse Mangematin.83 The forms of legitimacy privately invoked by the 
 
77 Report of the 9/06/1905, Executive Commission of the Jaunes to the Minister of the Interior, Eugène 
Étienne, AN, F/7/12793. 
78 Le Jaune, 18/06/1904, p. 1. 
79 La Voix Française, 02/06/1911, p. 1.  
80 Gauthier, Le clergé, 84 and following.  
81 Le Jaune, 03/06/1905, p. 3. 
82 Report of the Chief of the Guards, 16-29 Mai 1899, AFB, D1L0075-02. Gendarmerie Nationale Section of 
Le Creusot to Préfet, 13/01/1900, ADSL, M 3288. 
83 La semaine religieuse du diocèse de Rouen, 01/01/1876, p. 22. Documents Officiels sur la grève du 
Creusot du 20 au 28 septembre 1899, p. 3, AFB, SSa207. On the political use of institutionalised sacredness 
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Yellow movement to act beyond the socio-legal reality of the “de facto monopoly” 
were not so subtle. 
In 1905, Baron Alexandre Dreux, the industrialist who dominated Longwy, who con-
tributed to the centralisation of the industrialists by Schneider-Creusot through the 
UIMM (Fraboulet 2007, 58), and who called on and paid the Yellow strikebreakers cre-
ated by the latter, published in the organ of the French industrialists an article on “How 
to avoid a strike”, although he signed it under pseudonym (Gordon 1996b, 152). This 
concealment signals the republican reality of the control of violence. “In each work-
shop, let’s appoint an anti-strike guard, a dozen henchmen among the rudest persons 
(…). Now, let’s create our own union, blue, green, yellow, whatever you want”, thus 
targeting the “Social Republic”, through a violence that he called an “energic medica-
ment”: such were his words.84 Interestingly enough, the democratic reality of the “So-
cial Republic” (invoked by the French workers since the European Revolution of 1848 
and inseparable from the practice of the republican citizenship) was also targeted by 
the other industrialists from the East, when these nationalist activists promoted the 
Yellow movement of antirepublican strikebreakers.85  
The brutality of the Yellow movement was always linked to the very top of the social 
ladder. That is precisely why, in order to create an artificial semblance of popular legit-
imacy and to act covertly and beyond the republican reality of the “de facto monopo-
ly”, the nationalist ideology of these antirepublican strikebreakers needed to allege 
that they came from the bottom of the social ladder. Their nationalist ideology tried to 
turn the social facts upside down, to deny the national and republican reality. They 
were deprived of any popular support, but the semblance of the latter was necessary, 
to privately act violently beyond the republican control of violence, with a public ap-
pearance of justification. Interestingly enough, the nationalist strikebreakers who came 
from Paris to Longwy used also pseudonyms.86 This allowed to maintain the effective 
illusion of a movement having emerged locally and from below, whereas, in fact, this 
counterrevolutionary and antirepublican organisation was centralised in Paris, and in-
separable from the nationalist elites dominating the industrial society. 
The republican and democratic legality of the “de facto monopoly” forced them to 
conceal their umbilical link with this counterrevolutionary movement of antirepublican 
 
to support these counterrevolutionary strikebreakers, see Luis Renshaw de Orea y de Ascanio. Camérier 
Secret de Cape et d’Épée de sa Sainteté, Le Saint Siège et le modernisme, Paris, La Voix Française, 1910, 
Don Flavio Settin, La Chiesa Cattolica e la Proprietà Privata, Bassano, Fontana-Minchio, 1911. 
84 All the previous quotations are from L’écho des mines et de la métallurgie, 29/06/1905, pp. 779-781. 
85 Gaston Japy, Les idées Jaunes, Paris, Plon, 1906, p. 284. 
86 Report of “Naples”, 01/08/1905, AN, F/7/12793. 
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strikebreakers. In addition, it obliged these nationalist activists to prevalently use small 
arms. On 5 July 1905, Pierre Biétry and his brutish henchmen went to the Café Boutin 
in Longwy. They were armed with sticks, that they used to cruelly beat Edmond Backès, 
who was responsible for a team of workers at the steelworks of the industrial centre of 
Longwy.87 In this industrial agglomeration of the East, indeed, the baron Dreux had ille-
gally decreed that no democratic dialogue would take place with the French workers 
and republican citizens. After this brutal expedition, Biétry convinced the police, which 
investigated timidly, that the “obscurity was complete, and that it was impossible to 
see who was slugging”.88 This counterrevolutionary and violent obscurantism was rein-
forced by Edgard Laroche-Joubert, a big industrialist, rightist representative from Cha-
rente (western France) and member of the Yellow headquarter in Paris, who applied 
pressure on the investigators, by writing directly to the Minister of Justice to deny any 
implication of Biétry and even his presence in Longwy, in spite of evidence.89 In the 
same counterfactual way, the Yellow activist Richaud accepted, in exchange for money, 
to cover the right-hand man of Dreux, Georges Vallot, after the latter badly beat an-
other French worker and republican citizen.90 
Interestingly enough, the republican reality of the “de facto monopoly” obliged the 
Yellow strikebreakers to act covertly, and to use small arms like sticks. This signals that 
armed violence was effectively controlled in pre-1914 France. This institutionalised ef-
fectiveness forced these antirepublican fanatics to conceal their violent practices. In 
1905, the industrialists of Longwy, who called on and paid the handfuls of Yellow 
strikebreakers who came from Paris, received six Lebel rifles, six model 1892 revolvers 
and around one hundred packets of war ammunitions.91 Yet, this violence based on 
firearms remained potential. Indeed, these unused firearms were immediately confis-
cated by the republican authorities, though these elites controlling the juridical institu-
tions concealed the armed brutality envisaged by the industrialists.92 The systematic 
strategy of illegal concealment was imposed by the effective control of violence, which 
was inseparable from the democratic character inherent to the republican citizenship. 
Consequently, it is no accident that the nationalist strikebreakers of the Yellow move-
 
87 L’Humanité, 02/06/1906, with the police material in AN, F/7/15931/2. 
88 Procureur Général à Garde des Sceaux de la Cour d’Appel de Nancy, 10/01/1906, AN, F7, BB/18/2293/1.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Official Declaration at the Tribunal Correctionnel, L’Humanité, 02/07/1908, p. 2. Chambre des Députés, 
03/11/1905, p. 3022.  
91 “À Monsieur le Garde des Sceaux, le Procureur Général près de la Cour d’appel de Nancy”, 08/08/1905, 
AN, F7, BB/18/2293/1. Corroborated in Gauthier, Le clergé, 113, 116. 
92 “À Monsieur le Garde des Sceaux, le Procureur Général près de la Cour d’appel de Nancy”, 08/08/1905, 
AN, F7, BB/18/2293/1. 
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ment also targeted the latter, by using the same forms of small and centralised vio-
lence. 
 
 
4. Yellow Violence in the Political Field: Anti-Republicanism 
 
The Yellow command post was based in Paris. This European city was the capital of 
anti-republicanism. Indeed, it was the best place to assault the democratic character 
inherent to republican citizenship in pre-1914 Europe which remained dominated by 
monarchies. At the turn of the century, the nationalist and monarchist groupuscules 
radicalised. Among other matters, these counterrevolutionary activists and antirepubli-
can fanatics did not accept the democratic and republican rehabilitation of Captain 
Dreyfus. In 1899, these nationalist minorities attempted an antirepublican coup d’État 
from the streets of Paris, ten years only after the antidemocratic coup of Boulanger.93 
Those who defended the democratic character inherent to the republican citizenship, 
by contributing to the rehabilitation of Dreyfus, denounced the “false interests un-
chained” by the “nationalist reaction”.94 Thus, a nationalist activist close to the Yellow 
command post (and son of Joseph-Marie Lecocq, general of the Second Empire) went 
until Bordeaux, to spit in the face of the general Picquart, since this republican officer 
of the Army contributed to the democratic rehabilitation of Dreyfus.95 “Nationalism 
means monarchy” stated the antirepublican activists inseparable from the Yellow 
movement and from its capital, in this context of imperialist rivalry which was marked 
by the scandal of military-industrial espionage.96 
On 28 February 1901 in Paris, the reactionary ideologue François Coppée took the 
floor at a meeting of the nationalist and Paris-based organisation Patrie Française (PF; 
French Fatherland) to brandish “the Yellow flag”.97 Like the Yellow strikebreakers in the 
industrial centres, the privileged minorities of the PF sent their brutish henchmen in 
the cities of the French territory.98 For example, the bands of Marius and of Dauville 
came from the Parisian slums, and they worked as violent henchmen for the antidemo-
cratic PF.99 “The whoremongers of the Faubourg Montmartre, Savoyard and his friends, 
 
93 Affaire de la place de la Nation, Procès Déroulède, Paris, Drapeau, 1899. 
94 Jean Jaurès, Les deux méthodes, Lille, Lagrange, 1900, p. 4, 7. 
95 La Lanterne, 13/08/1907, p. 2. Le Temps, 13/08/1907, p. 4. 
96 Le Soleil, 20/05/1900, p. 1. 
97 Report of “Drome”, 01/03/1901, AN, F/7/1279. 
98 Report of “Lazare”, 15/12/1905 and report of “Meuse”, 16/11/1905, AN, F/7/12793. 
99 Report of “Rennes”, 12/04/1902, AN, F/7/12793. 
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who frequent the café Fin de Siècle close to the one Chez Brébant, are all engaged by 
the Patrie Française” reported a covert policeman.100 “They are three or four bands, 
most of them are armed”, he added.101 Coppée did in fact frequent the luxurious café 
Brébant in Paris, which was very close to the more shady Fin de Siècle.102 Furthermore, 
his elitist sociabilities linked him to the powerful industrialists from the East, such as 
the Japy family, whose nationalist members funded and promoted the Yellow move-
ment.103 
On 23 February 1902, during the national campaign for the legislative elections, the 
nationalist PF organised a meeting in Belfort, at the Franco-German border. This indus-
trial centre of the East of France was also the birthplace of the Yellow leader, and of his 
mentor and sponsor, the industrialist Gaston Japy.104 The meeting in Belfort took place 
in a Yellow institution, that is, the counter-Maison du Peuple founded by Armand Viel-
lard, another big industrialist and rightist representative of the industrial and dominant 
interests of Eastern France.105 “Seventy bodyguards, well paid, have been sent from 
Paris in groups”, an undercover policeman from Paris reported.106 “Their numbers will 
be tripled for the next travels”, he added, to explain this nationalist coordination, be-
tween Paris and the industrial cities characterising the French territory, and which 
were concentrated in the East.107 
The undercover policemen who observed these nationalist and counterrevolutionary 
activists also described their concealed rituals of gifts and counter-gifts, whose armed 
dimension was inseparable from the republican reality of the “de facto monopoly”. In-
deed, this republican control of violence forced these nationalist activists to avoid the 
use of firearms, and to conceal the small ones. “The squad leaders bear sticks called 
bullwhips (nerfs de boeuf) which are amongst the most dangerous arms; the weight of 
these sticks is around two kilograms”, and the nationalist henchmen were initiated by 
their superiors, who showed them “how to do”, reported an infiltrated policeman.108 
Two clubs, six leaded canes and one leather strap with a metal head were seized by the 
republican police to these nationalists in arms sent in Belfort, where they used these 
 
100 17/04/1902, AN, F/7/12793. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Auguste Lepage, Les dîners artistiques et littéraires de Paris, Paris, Frinzine, 1884, p. 101. 
103 Marguerite Steinheil, My Memoirs, New York, Sturgis Walton, 1912. Japy, Les idées. 
104 Ibid. 
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small arms.109 The French workers and republican citizens, who resisted against the at-
tack of this “guard of honour coming from the slums of Paris”, labelled its nationalist 
activists “fake patriots”.110 Indeed, these armed minorities were covertly paid to act 
beyond the republican control of violence inherent to the French society and to its 
democratic citizenship. Thus, their nationalist and counterrevolutionary propaganda 
tried to turn the social facts upside down. By invoking rhetorically and artificially the 
national dimension, these nationalists hoped to conceal their self-serving dogma. 
“The reactionary party is happy to have found a man who performs the role of 
worker as certain actors interpret the crowd”: such were the comments of republican 
policemen on the leader of the Yellow movement.111 Biétry effectively simulated a 
working-class identity just as Yellow propaganda claimed a popular support which did 
not exist. Its semblance, however, contributed to conceal effectively the umbilical link 
relating systematically these antirepublican strikebreakers to the very top of the social 
ladder, and to the Paris-based capital of nationalism, which tried to covertly and vio-
lently deny the socio-legal reality of the “de facto monopoly”. Yellow meant nothing 
less but systematic falsification, which was necessary to use violence beyond the re-
publican control of violence. Accordingly, the non-lethal use of a revolver in the indus-
trial city of Tourcoing by Biétry in 1906 was concealed by two local hierarchs of the Yel-
low movement, who were traders in the spinning industry, and respectively the son 
and the nephew of a General Councillor.112  
What is more, the counterrevolutionary dimension inherent to the Yellow move-
ment and to its violence largely overflowed the national borders. Paradoxically, the 
French Republican State had an alliance with the monarchy which best embodied the 
early modern (that is, previous to the Revolution of 1789) and violent remanence of 
the feudal times: tsarist Russia. The Franco-Russian alliance, which was officially stipu-
lated in 1894 (although it had been prepared since the counterrevolutionary aftermath 
of the Commune) was both a financial and military bloc. It was the most important im-
perialist trust that the world had ever seen. It linked the biggest oversea Empire (after 
the British one) with the most important continental one, for a total of around 
40,000,000 square kilometres in 1914 (Jarrige and Fureix 2015, 329; Rey 2014). Militari-
ly, the Franco-Russian alliance aimed to surround the Kaiserreich with two main mili-
tary fronts (France on the west side, and Russia on the east side), in the violent per-
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spective of the revanche so actively desired by the nationalist activists linked to milita-
rism. Besides, the unparalleled military and imperialist dimension of the Franco-
Russian alliance was inseparable from the most important financial flows of the time. 
Before 1914, indeed, 11,719,638,666 Francs were sent from republican and industrial 
France to rural and absolutist Russia (Girault 1973, 24).  
On this transnational basis, a Yellow alliance developed from the Atlantic to the 
Urals. It linked the Paris-based FNJF with the Union for the Russian People (URP).113 
This monarchist organisation was inseparable from violence, whose antidemocratic 
character linked to the Russian Empire traditionally denied any political liberalism. Af-
ter the latter had been finally imposed in Russia, through the Revolution of 1905, the 
URP tried “to give a political content to the reaction” (Girault and Ferro 1989, 90). 
What is more, the Yellow alliance between the FNJF and the URP was officially sanc-
tioned in 1907 in Fribourg (Switzerland).114 This was exactly where an antidemocratic, 
secret, transnational and counterrevolutionary “reaction against (…) the modern Na-
tion State” was politically organised in the aftermath of the Commune, on behalf of 
Rome-based institutionalised sacredness (Lamberts 2002, 72). “Monarchism will re-
emerge in France (…) only if it also develops everywhere” affirmed the URP.115 These 
counterrevolutionary activists linked to the FNJF labelled themselves “Black Hundreds” 
(or tchernossotensy, because this paramilitary armed group reproduced the organisa-
tion of the tsarist Cossacks, or sotnias), by affirming that they were “self-organised 
monarchists”.116  
Meanwhile, the international arms merchant and Yellow promoter Schneider devel-
oped financial and industrial partnerships in tsarist Russia, thus contributing to rein-
force the financial, industrial and military dimension of the Franco-Russian alliance.117 
In addition, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, a member of the Yellow command post in Paris, was 
secretly paid by the tsarist authorities to praise the financial basis of this imperialist 
trust.118 His own brother contributed to the Franco-Russian alliance, by praising “the 
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paternalistic and religious character” of absolutism.119 “Popular sovereignty is one of 
the most dangerous ideas”, he also deplored about the democratic effects of the Revo-
lution of 1789, because “on behalf of religion (…) we cannot admit the Law enforce-
ment by the masses”.120 In addition, he invoked politically institutionalised sacredness, 
to encourage the “global expansion” through the transnational export of “our capital 
and our missionaries”, for what he called the “the time of universal rivalry”.121 This im-
perialism was inseparable from the Yellow movement, and it was complexifying the re-
publican and industrial reality of the “de facto monopoly”. 
Interestingly enough, the French workers and republican citizens from Le Creusot 
termed this industrial centre a “State within the State”, and a “capitalist fiefdom”.122 
This evoked a remanence of the feudal times, that the Revolution of 1789 started to 
abolish by imposing popular sovereignty and a democratic citizenship inseparable from 
the republican control of violence. Paradoxically, this reference to the feudal past char-
acterising the industrial centre of Le Creusot was inseparable from the most modern, 
financial and industrial forms of imperialism, as evidenced with the activity of Schnei-
der in Morocco at the turn of the century (Guillen 1976), concomitantly to the creation 
of the antirepublican strikebreakers. In 1900, interestingly enough, the first Yellow ac-
tivists of Le Creusot paraded throughout the town by agitating “small yellow flags with 
the emblems of tsarist Russia”, which republican policemen had great pains to ex-
plain.123  
In 1906, the leader of the Yellow movement met in secret the ambassador of tsarist 
Russia in Paris, the Count Nelidoff.124 Until 1914, his office was the “command post in 
Europe” for tsarist secret services.125 A handful of republican representatives, such as 
Jean Jaurès, the internationalist intellectual who created L’Humanité (The Mankind), 
denounced in the Assemblée Nationale the fact that this foreign police acted from Paris 
“as on conquered territory”.126 In contrast with the socio-legal and republican reality of 
the “de facto monopoly”, indeed, none legal public control was exerted on these agen-
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cies inseparable from imperialism and from the Franco-Russian alliance (Berlière and 
Lévy 2013, 672). This monarchical intrusion on the French and republican soil was also 
condemned by policemen. They denounced the increasing denial of a republican and 
democratic control of violence since the turn of the century, in relation with the First 
International Conference of Social Defence against the Anarchists, which took place in 
1898 in Rome.127  
“Jaurès serves the police” affirmed the Yellow movement, by imagining a Franco-
Russian connection between the internationalist intellectual and Yevno Azev.128 The le-
thal and terrorist violence of the latter, in fact, served tsarist police. In agreement with 
its nationalist dogma, the Yellow movement turned the social facts upside down. “The 
situation is better in Russia (…) we ask freedom like in Russia” also said these antire-
publican strikebreakers, by targeting “the liberals”.129 In agreement with their coun-
terrevolutionary ideology, “freedom” meant “dictatorial and antirepublican oppres-
sion”. Biétry worked “for an international organisation”, observed the republican po-
licemen.130 In 1904, while the active minorities of the Yellow movement created its 
newspaper (and main symbolic source of artificial legitimacy), the Second International 
Conference of Social Defence against the Anarchists was organised in Saint Petersburg 
(Berlière and Lévy 2013, 672). Contemporary witnesses commented on the emergence 
of the Yellow movement, by observing “the most disgusting wheeling and dealing in-
volving companies and Government polices”.131 
In 1906, interestingly enough, the first promoter of these counterrevolutionary 
strikebreakers in the Russian Empire was an engineer, who wrote to the Yellow com-
mand post in Paris from the capital of Saint Petersburg.132 Interestingly enough, this 
transnational and Franco-Russian export of the Yellow movement was realised through 
the counterrevolutionary UPS, that the other engineer Le Play had created in 1872. In-
deed, like the promoters of the Yellow movement in its birthplace of Montceau-
Creusot at the turn of the century, Nicolas de Zvorikine was a member of the Paris-
based UPS. It is also in this European capital of anti-republicanism that his industrial 
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company, which was located in Siberia, had its financial basis.133 In addition, the politi-
cal control of institutionalised sacredness involved the prosecutor of the Saint Peters-
bourg-based Holy Synod, Constantin Pobiedonotsev, who contributed to create the fi-
nancial basis of the Franco-Russian alliance (Girault 1973, 141). Consequently, the Yel-
low movement signals a counterrevolutionary and nationalist connection of institu-
tionalised sacredness inseparable from imperialism, whose transnational dimension 
was modifying the republican and national reality of the “de facto monopoly”. 
In 1907, the Yellow command post in Paris privately received nationalist activists 
from the Russian Empire, headed by the Vice President of the Central Office of the 
Monarchist Circles of Students from Russia, Nicolas Soutchkoff.134 In 1911, the nation-
alist leader of the Yellow movement referred to the to the URP and to the Black Hun-
dreds as models for the secret “legion” created “in prevision of the war”, against the 
“enemies terrorised” by these nationalists in arms.135 It “won’t be talked anymore” 
about these “rude volunteers armed and disciplined”, whose sleeping cells “will act 
when the time will have come”, explained Biétry, who explained that the international-
ist intellectual Jean Jaurès would be “the first to be executed”.136 Jaurès, whose paci-
fism operated peacefully in the industrial heart of Europe, was hated by the nationalist 
activists because encouraged the democratic action “on both sides of the Franco-
German border”, to create “the same resistance against the danger of war”, by using 
one repertoire: “the general and simultaneous strike”.137 On 31 July 1914, he was as-
sassinated, shot twice in the head by a nationalist activist. In 1919, the assassin was 
acquitted by a judge so marked by the illegal aspiration of counterrevolutionary and 
imperialist violence, that he deemed this nationalist activist to be a “patriot”.138  
During his trial, the murderer of Jaurès invoked the historical notion of time, to ex-
plain how strikes scared him several months before the outbreak of the First World 
War: “I had the presentiment that the glorious time, which would in fact come after-
wards, could occur if we wanted it” and “I was afraid that everything happened differ-
ently than expected”, in consequence of “the strike against military mobilisation”.139 
Interestingly enough, the origins of the unusual firearm lethally used by this strike-
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breaker unpunished by the State authorities have never been ascertained.140 Conse-
quently, this void regarding armed violence and nationalist sociabilities should call for 
future investigation, as recent historiography suggests (Lalouette 2014). Since the Yel-
low movement delivered detailed instructions, and since its violence was specialised in 
antirepublican strikebreaking, logic dictates to consider the nationalist sociabilities link-
ing this group to the counterrevolutionary elites confiscating capital. 
A few months prior to the First World War, which he campaigned for vociferously, 
the Yellow leader moved to Indochina, to lead the Rubber Company and Diverse Culti-
vations from Cam Tien (Dang-Khé), whose capital was of 1,600,000 Francs.141 In this 
colony, he continued to “commit frequent atrocities” against workers, what he tried to 
justify by invoking an “insufficiency of police forces”, and by using an “imperishable 
stick, of which it is preferable not to say nothing more”.142 He practiced this obscurant-
ist violence against the workers in the colonial reality, as he had done before in the 
metropolitan one and against the French workers and republican citizens. In addition, 
this nationalist activist took charge of the Financial and Economic Newsletter of Indo-
china (Bulletin Financier et Économique de l’Indochine, which was later directed by his 
wife), and became a banker.143  
 
5. Conclusion 
The FNJF was a fraudulent organisation. At the turn of the century, the Yellow 
movement was created from the top of the social ladder. Conversely, its nationalist 
ideology never ceased to claim an origin from below. Yet, these antirepublican strike-
breakers never enjoyed a popular support. This contradiction has gone unobserved un-
til now. Indeed, classical historiography has used the national and dominant prism by 
mainly focusing on the discourses. Conversely, this cross-disciplinary article has exam-
ined these antirepublican strikebreakers as a social movement, by analysing their vio-
lent practices and their discourses trying to justify them. The Yellow movement was lit-
erally counterrevolutionary, that is, diametrically opposed to the democratic conquests 
begun with the popular mobilisations of the Revolution of 1789, and inseparable from 
the democratic citizenship. Interestingly enough, the Yellow movement shared the 
same nationalist, counterrevolutionary and antirepublican conception than the Second 
Empire with regard to the juridical dimension. Indeed, these strikebreakers invoked 
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“their legality and ours” until 1914, exactly like the imperial dictatorship (1852-1870) 
claimed to “have abandoned the legality in order to impose the Law”.144 
Thus, this analysis of the Yellow movement deepens our knowledge of the demo-
cratic character inherent to the republican citizenship (Agulhon 1978, 844; Weber 
1976). The Yellow movement based in Paris and developed transnationally illustrates 
how “the organisations of workers are inseparable from their symmetrical opposite” 
(Delalande 2019, 133). That is why these nationalist activists affirmed that the French 
workers and republican citizens, that they tried to infiltrate, and against whom they 
used violence, were “tricked by internationalism”.145 This counterrevolutionary ideolo-
gy aimed at accumulating capital, by denying the republican institutions, and the dem-
ocratic principle of the right of the soil. In contrast, these antirepublican activists 
evoked ethnocentrically a ius sanguinis based on the most archaic and dogmatic be-
liefs, through the obscurantist and antidemocratic statement: “few members of man-
kind are good except your own family (..,) your own blood”.146 On the ideological basis 
of this counterrevolutionary and nationalist dogma, the Yellow movement affirmed its 
“impartiality” when imbricating “religion and fatherland” to condemn “the monopoli-
sation of the State”, that is, to deny the national and republican reality based on dem-
ocratic citizenship.147 
This counterrevolutionary forma mentis linked to the top of the social ladder was 
shaped by a fanaticism literally xenophobic, that is, based on hatred of the masses. On 
behalf of this profound antidemocratic belief, these antirepublican strikebreakers con-
nected far-right radicalisation to institutionalised sacredness. Their nationalist violence 
was practiced against the French workers and republican citizens with the pretention 
of denying the socio-legal and institutional reality of the “de facto monopoly”. The 
cross-disciplinary use of sociological concepts signals its historical existence in the in-
dustrial heart of pre-1914 Europe.148 The republican control of violence forced the Yel-
low minorities to act covertly. In addition, their violence was non-lethal and mainly 
based on the use of small arms in the economic field (strikebreaking), as well as in the 
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political one (anti-republicanism). The French capital was the best place in which to as-
sault the democratic citizenship. That is why Paris was the command post of the Yellow 
movement in pre-1914 Europe, which remained dominated by monarchies until the 
first post-World War. 
These antirepublican strikebreakers corresponded to a counter-internationalism in 
the making, whose violence was created by an international arms merchant. Indeed, 
the Yellow movement penetrated systematically in the dominant monarchies (Castillo 
1977, 42-51; Maillard 2006, 297-303), by stating: “Socialist internationalism is destruc-
tive for patriotism. Conversely, Yellow internationalism is profitable” (Bonnet and Ca-
ruso 2019).149 This antidemocratic dogma based on capital was the denial of republican 
unionism. “Internationalism means war” also said the nationalist activists inseparable 
from the capital of the Yellow movement, while they never ceased to act for the re-
vanche.150 They targeted the “German Jewish Karl Marx” and the “pacifist (…) Jaurès”, 
that they accused of “germanistation” because he never ceased to act for peace in the 
industrial heart of Europe.151 Shortly before 1914, the leader of the Yellow movement 
tried to ponder the counterrevolutionary profitability of an unparalleled and anti-
European violence, by anticipating: “The declaration of a war would destroy the inter-
nationalist perspectives”.152 
In addition, the most important transnational connections of the Yellow movement 
were inseparable from the gigantic financial flows which benefited the counterrevolu-
tionary activists of the Russian Empire. Their nationalist violence “set the style ten 
years before Fascism” (Rogger 1964, 399). In this rural monarchy dominated by the 
great property, they could commit their brutal and illegal aggressions with impunity 
(Girault 1973, 430), through concealed collusions with the official elites (far-right po-
licemen, officials, politicians, judges, scholars, etc.). Before 1914, interestingly enough, 
the representative from the Italian monarchy in the Parisian command post of the Yel-
low movement was a covert policeman. Enrico Insabato then lived in rue de la grande 
chaumière in Paris, not that far from the Yellow command post located in Boulevard 
des Italiens.153 As early as in 1906, this imperialist activist explicitly encouraged massive 
violence, that his fanaticism tried to legitimate by arguing that his lately unified country 
was “not brutal enough to enjoy the colonial glory”.154 During the first post-World War, 
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Fascism emerged by provoking an unparalleled and unpunished peak of lethal violence, 
which targeted a popular mobilisation without precedents in this rural society domi-
nated by the great property (Tilly 1975, 126; González Calleja 2015, 57). During the in-
terwar period, Insabato contributed covertly to the imperialist expansion that this 
monarchy finally realised through Fascism (Vento 2010, 110 and 383).155  
Its armed subjects also supported transnationally the illegal violence of the coup 
d’État of 1936, by targeting the Spanish workers and republican citizens, that the coun-
terrevolutionary organisations assaulted, on behalf of a nationalist sacredness deriving 
from the Yellow movement (Castillo 1977 and 1979; Preston 2012). Hence, its increas-
ing violence inseparable from imperialism invites to deepen the comparative and ex-
planatory history of European societies, before and after 1914 (Bloch 1928).156 
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